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SOLVING THE CHEVRON PUZZLE
LINDA R. COHEN* AND MATr-EW L. SPrrZER**
I
INTRODUCTION
In Chevron, US.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,1 the Supreme
Court announced a now famous doctrine. When the federal courts review an
administrative agency's interpretation of its own statute, the agency's interpreta-
tion may be set aside only if Congress has "directly spoken to the precise
question at issue"2 and the agency's interpretation fails to conform to congres-
sional intent. Congress may speak to a question either by enacting clear
language, or by unambiguous legislative history. If congressional intent is
unclear or missing, the federal courts must defer to the administrative interpreta-
tion as long as that interpretation is reasonable.3 As has been suggested, this
two-step test can be boiled down to the rule that federal courts must respect any
reasonable interpretation by an administrative agency of its own statute.4
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1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron involved a challenge to some regulations by the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA"). The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) required states with overly polluted air to
regulate new stationary sources of air pollution through a permit program. States were to grant permits
for new, major stationary sources of air pollution only under very stringent conditions. The EPA
regulations allowed states to treat entire factories as single stationary sources. If a factory, rather than
each smokestack or each furnace, were to be a single source, factory managers could introduce new
polluting equipment as long as overall pollution from the factory did not rise. For example, factory
managers could retire old equipment that polluted at least as much as the new equipment. Under such
a scenario, no permits would be required from the EPA.
The Natural Resources Defense Council obtained a reversal of the EPA regulations in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718 (1982). The court of appeals found that the EPA did not permit a factory-wide
definition of stationary source. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, relying upon the test
explained above.
2. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
3. The language the court used was "permissible," but commentators agree that this is to be
interpreted as "reasonable." See, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3
YALE J. ON REG. 283, 288 (1986).
4. Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of Statutes: An Analysis of
Chevron's Step Two, 2 ADMIN. LJ. 255, 265 n.10 (1988).
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The Chevron decision has prompted a great deal of scholarly attention,
much of which has centered on the jurisprudential and institutional appropriate-
ness of the Chevron doctrine,6 or the tendency of the doctrine to produce
political ramifications in its application in subsequent decisions 7 Recently,
however, four articles have been published that take a somewhat different
approach. A pair of articles by William Eskridge and John Ferejohn' utilize
formal political scientific models of the interaction between administrative
agencies, Congress, the president, and the Court.9 Eskridge and Ferejohn argue
on the basis of these models that the introduction of the administrative state has
fundamentally altered the balance of power in the federal government. They
5. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1990); Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Get
Judicial Deference?-A Preliminary Inquiry, 40 ADMIN. L. REv. 121 (1988); Colin S. Diver, Statutory
Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 589 (1985); Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial
Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269 (1988)
(arguing that Chevron is a logical corollary to the courts' acceptance of extremely liberal delegations of
authority to executive agencies despite the nondelegation doctrine); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial
Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems In
Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of
Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300 (arguing that the combination of very demanding standards for
justifying agency rulemaking when reviewed by the federal courts of appeals and the intense and
intrusive politicization of the D.C. Circuit has rendered agency rulemaking much less attractive than ad
hoc adjudication and that Chevron provides a wonderful remedy for this problem by reining in the D.C.
Circuit); Symposium, Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 2 ADMIN L.J. 243 (1988); Russell
L. Weaver, Judicial Interpretation of Administrative Regulations: The Deference Rule, 45 U. PrrT. L.
REv. 587 (1984); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
2071 (1990) (arguing first that Chevron's allocation of "governmental authority ... far exceeds [in
importance] that of the Supreme Court's more celebrated constitutional rulings on the subject of
separation of power," but then reformulating Chevron to stand for the much less radical proposal that
a reviewing court will not defer if it has a "firm" view that an administrative agency's interpretation is
wrong, even if the agency's interpretation is potentially reasonable).
6. See Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer to Agency Interpretations of Statutes?:
A New Doctrinal Basis for Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1991 WiS. L. REV.
1275 (arguing that Chevron is best interpreted as a voluntary, prudential limitation on the Supreme
Court's review of agencies and, as such, Chevron should be applied flexibly, on a case-by-case basis);
Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989) (arguing that Chevron implicitly redefines separation of powers in a naive
and unhealthy manner); Starr, supra note 3; Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law:
Some Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 427, 438 (1989) (claiming that one of the logical
implications of Chevron is that committee reports and other bits and pieces of legislative history should
be available to an administrative agency that is trying to interpret its own statute); Sunstein, supra note
5.
7. William S. Jordan, III, Deference Revisited: Politics as a Determinant of Deference Doctrine and
the End of the Apparent Chevron Consensus, 68 NEB. L. REV. 454 (1989).
8. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. LJ. 523
(1992) [hereinafter Eskridge & Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game]; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John
Ferejohn, Making the Deal Stick- Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the
Modern Regulatory State, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 165 (1992). See also Peter Strauss & Andrew Rutten,
The Game of Politics and Law: A Response to Eskridge and Ferejohn, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205 (1992).
9. The Eskridge and Ferejohn work builds on their own prior work, and the work of many others
working in the field. For an introduction, see the symposia contained in 8 J.L.ECON. & ORG. 1-214
(1992) and 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 123-284 (1992), and DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY,
LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991). For a good review of the part of the
literature dealing with Supreme Court decisionmaking, see Peter H. Aranson, Models of Judicial Choice
as Allocation and Distribution in Constitutional Law, B.Y.U. L. REV. 745 (1990).
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claim that aggressive judicial review of administrative agencies can help restore
some of the original balance. Consequently, Chevron, which reins in the
judiciary, has little to recommend it.
A third article by Peter Schuck and Donald Elliott used an empirical
approach to study the effect of Chevron on the lower federal courts." Schuck
and Elliott read and coded federal appellate opinions from four six-month peri-
ods-1965, 1974-75, 1984, and 1985-and from a two-month period in 1988.11
Part of the study focused on the effect of Chevron on the rate of affirmance of
administrative decisions. Schuck and Elliott found, among other things, that
Chevron significantly reduced the rate at which federal courts of appeal
remanded cases based on rejection of an administrative agency's interpretation
of its own statute.12
A fourth article, by Thomas Merrill, 3  examined Supreme Court
decisionmaking before and after the Chevron decision. He found that the
Supreme Court has not been faithful to Chevron, often failing to follow the
Chevron framework and failing to accept administrative agency interpretation of
statutes.
The work of Eskridge and Ferejohn, Schuck and Elliott, and Merrill provides
extremely valuable new insights into Chevron and its relationship to the modem
system of administrative government in the United States. However, all four
articles leave unsolved some crucial puzzles about the Chevron decision.
Eskridge and Ferejohn fail to address the issue of why the Supreme Court would
adopt the Chevron doctrine. As part II of this article shows in greater detail,
Eskridge and Ferejohn's analysis suggests, at least at first glance, that Supreme
Court Justices will get less preferred political outcomes under Chevron than
under aggressive judicial review. Hence, one might think that rational Supreme
Court Justices would refuse to adopt the Chevron doctrine. The Court's
adoption of the Chevron doctrine, therefore, poses a theoretical puzzle. 4
Schuck and Elliott, whose work concentrates only on federal courts of appeal,
leave an empirical puzzle: what is the effect of Chevron on subsequent Supreme
Court review of administrative agency interpretations of statutes? Merrill
provides a good first effort at reviewing the Supreme Court data, but his work
10. Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal
Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984.
11. Id. at 990.
12. Id. at 1034-35.
13. Merrill, supra note 5.
14. Susan Rose-Ackerman has personally suggested to us that modem cases on standing to
challenge administrative agency actions present much the same puzzle. See, e.g., Lujan v. National
Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990). Professor Michael Asimow has suggested to us that a whole host
of rules effectively preventing litigants from entering the court system-political question doctrine, items
committed to agency discretion by law, immunities, and, of course, standing-might also prevent the
Supreme Court from having a chance to muck around with administrative agency policies. Why would
the Supreme Court promulgate rules excluding litigants? We might explain these rules with a model
similar to our rational choice model, infra part II, by modeling the exclusion of litigants from the court
system as infinite deference to the agency.
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misinterprets the nature of Supreme Court decisions. In order to determine the
signal that the Supreme Court sends to lower courts, the Court's decisions must
be placed in a hierarchical framework. We attempt this modeling exercise here.
While part II of this article attempts to solve the puzzle of why a rational
court would adopt the Chevron doctrine, part III presents evidence on the
change in court behavior induced by Chevron. The results suggest the following
scenario: by the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court and the administrative agencies
had moved to a conservative policy position relative to both Congress and the
appellate courts. Consequently, agencies could rule in a conservative manner
only if allowed to exercise greater discretion in their interpretation of federal
statutes. The Supreme Court could grant greater discretion by signaling to the
appellate courts that they should allow agencies greater discretion in the
interpretation of statutes. For about three years following Chevron, the Supreme
Court continued to signal the appellate courts to afford agencies greater
discretion. Furthermore, the rate at which the courts of appeal upheld
administrative statutory interpretations first increased and then declined, just as
the rational equilibrium model of case filings predicts.
The data further indicate that by the late 1980s appellate courts had moved
closer to the Supreme Court's policy position, while the administrative agencies
under President Bush had become more liberal. As a consequence, the Supreme
Court wanted appellate courts to take a more active role in determining
administrative policy and therefore stopped sending signals demanding greater
deference to administrative statutory interpretations.
15
II
THE RATIONALITY OF THE ADOPTION OF CHEVRON
Eskridge and Ferejohn utilize a formal, sequential model of governmental
action to assess the effect of the Chevron decision. They assume that political
outcomes can be arrayed on a dimension running from conservative to liberal,
right to left. The political actors in their model have ideal points on the political
spectrum, and understand the nature of the game, including the preferences of
the other political actors. Everyone anticipates the behavior of the other actors
15. Dan Rodriguez has personally suggested to us that Chevron would better be analyzed within
the more general framework of judicial review of administrative action. In particular, the Chevron puzzle
cannot be solved without considering Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual
Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), a case that was almost contemporaneous with Chevron and which
some thought sounded the clarion call for judicial review of administrative choice of policy. The two
cases, read this way, seem to contradict the traditional administrative law principle that law is for courts
and that policy is for agencies.
While as a general matter we agree with Rodriguez, we will not pursue his suggestion in this
article. We are not sure State Farm was the signal for less deference on policy matters. There were
conflicting cases at about the same time, such as Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. N.R.D.C., 462 U.S. 87
(1983), and we have not checked the cases for sustained signals for less (or more) deference during that
time. The research program should be fairly easy to follow, after reading this article, and we hope some
day to have the funds to send some graduate students to do the legwork.
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but cannot commit to future courses of action. Each actor prefers that his or her
decisions not be overturned.
Eskridge and Ferejohn use the following notation, which we will follow:
SQ = Existing policy (status quo), the default position if no legislation
is enacted to deal with a social problem
H and S = Preferences of the median legislator in the two chambers of the
bicameral legislature
P = Preferences of the president
h and s = Preferences of the pivotal legislator in the House and Senate,
whose vote is needed for the two-thirds majority needed to
override a presidential veto
x =Statutory policy resulting from the game 6
First, Eskridge and Ferejohn analyze the political game without any
administrative agency, and show how this game tends to preserve the status quo.
Consider the following array of preferences on the policy spectrum.
h P SQ' H s SQ Si ______ I_ _____ I______ i _______ I........I ......... i -
Under this array of preferences, any status quo between P and S will be stable.
H and S will be unable to pass a statute that they both prefer to SQ, and which
P also prefers. If the status quo is SQ, H and S will be unable to pass any
statute. If the status quo is SQ', H and S will be able to pass a bill moving the
status quo to some x between H and S.
h P SQ' H x s S
1 I I I i I -
However, P will veto x, and h will vote to sustain the veto.
Next, Eskridge and Ferejohn introduce an administrative agency, A, into the
model, and allow it to choose a new status quo in the first step of the game. A's
preferences are assumed to equal those of P. As a consequence, the new
statutory outcome, x', gives P much more of what he or she wants than he or she
would get in the absence of A. To see this, consider the policy preferences from
above, but with the A inserted.
h P SQ' H S S
A.i _ i i I -
Az=x'
16. Eskridge & Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, supra note 8, at 529.
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With an administrative agency, the outcome shifts to x'=A=P, since the
administrative agency can act unilaterally, without the approval of the House or
Senate.
Eskridge and Ferejohn lament this shift in the balance of power to effectuate
outcomes, and then investigate the power of judicial review to ameliorate the
shift of power to the president. To do this, they introduce the median Justice of
the Supreme Court, J, in a way that can override the agency's choice of a new
status quo policy. They then show that the new policy outcome, x", is closer to
the outcome with no administrative agency, x, than was the outcome with an
administrative agency but no judicial review, x'.
h P SQ' H J s S
_______ I _______I _______II ......I _______ _i -
A x '
If the Court is faithful to the law, assumed to be at SQ', then the outcome will
be at SQ', the same as if there had been no administrative agency. If, instead,
the Court is a rationally self-interested maximizer, the outcome will depend
crucially on where the Court is located. In the array pictured above, the Court
can choose its ideal point, which is stable within the game described by article
1, section 7 of the Constitution. As long as J is located within (H,S,P), x"=J. If
J were to the right of S, x"=S, while if J were less than P, x"=P. It is only in this
last case that P gets his or her ideal point, the outcome all the time without
judicial review. Hence, judicial review shifts power away from A and toward J,
which may also be in the direction of H and S.
Eskridge and Ferejohn associate the Chevron doctrine with no judicial
review, and the pre-Chevron law with judicial review. They conclude that
Chevron is institutionally and normatively regrettable.
Regardless of whether or not the reader accepts Eskridge and Ferejohn's
normative conclusion," the reader should notice that the Chevron doctrine
results in policy outcomes that are, from the Court's point of view, worse than
the status quo. This phenomenon poses a puzzle. Why did the Supreme Court
adopt the Chevron doctrine? This article next explores three theories of the
rational adoption of Chevron.
17. See Strauss & Rutten, supra note 8 (criticizing Eskridge and Ferejohn's normative conclusions).
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A. Genuine Belief in the Political and Institutional Arguments
One possibility, which cannot be readily discounted, is that all or some of the
Justices genuinely believe the political and institutional arguments advanced for
the Chevron doctrine. 8 The arguments advanced in favor of Chevron include
at least the following: administrative agencies are expert agencies, and their
expertise extends to interpretation of their own statutes; much agency action,
including interpretation of statutes, is fundamentally political, and administrative
agencies are directly accountable to the more political branches; and, generally,
courts and administrative agencies are in a "checks and balances" relationship,
as suggested by Vermont Yankee v. N.R.D.C.,1 9 rather than in a "supervisory"
relationship, similar to that of the Supreme Court to lower federal courts.
Supreme Court Justices who believe these or other institutionally based
arguments supporting the Chevron doctrine might vote for the Chevron doctrine
despite its tendency to give them less of what they want in terms of substantive
policies. Such Justices might believe that it is wrong to choose the appropriate
degree of deference to be paid to administrative agencies based on the Justices'
personal preferences over policies. As in the Eskridge and Ferejohn model, we
would say that judges are utility maximizers. However, unlike the Eskridge and
Ferejohn model, we claim that judges derive utility from legal procedures as well
as from policy outcomes.
Although the "genuine belief" response provides a solution to the Chevron
puzzle, we will press for additional solutions for two basic reasons. First, the
genuine belief theory posits that Supreme Court Justices vote only on the basis
of preferences about institutional relationships. This is most unlikely. Justices
undoubtedly have preferences about judicial and administrative processes, but
not to the exclusion of policy considerations. Justices probably have preferences
about both levels of deference and policy outcomes, and vote with both
objectives in mind. Second, the theory explains Chevron as the result of some
sort of group epiphany in 1984; all the Justices realized at once that the federal
courts should defer to administrative agency statutory interpretations. This also
seems a bit unlikely. Hence, this solution to the Chevron puzzle seems to lack
intuitive appeal to those sophisticated in the ways of the Supreme Court. The
next part proposes an explanation that allows Justices to have preferences about
policy outcomes along with their preferences about levels of deference, and to
vote on the basis of both.
B. A Rational Choice Model
Our best attempt at resolving the puzzle adds two important elements to the
Eskridge and Ferejohn model. First, we focus on the relationship of the federal
appellate courts to both administrative agencies and the Supreme Court: the
18. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Marshall, and Justice O'Connor did not participate in Chevron.
19. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. N.R.D.C., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
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administrative agency chooses a policy which gets reviewed in a federal court of
appeals in accordance with the level of deference to the agency chosen by the
Supreme Court. Second, we posit that individual Justices have preferences over
a two dimensional space, with deference on one axis and policy on the other.
1. Adding Courts of Appeals and Two Demensional Preferences into the Game.
Posit a five-stage sequential game in two dimensional space. On the y axis, place
degree of deference given to administrative agency statutory interpretations. On
the x axis place policy outcomes:
Stage 0 (before the game): The House ("IT'), Senate ("S"), and
president ("P") pass a statute. The words of the statute, perhaps together
with other elements such as legislative history and past administrative
practice, produce a Best Statutory Interpretation ("BSP') point on the
policy axis.'
Stage 1: The Supreme Court ("SC") chooses a point d on the deference
axis.
Stage 2: An administrative agency ("AA") chooses a point on the policy
dimension.
Stage 3: The appeals court ("AC") reviews the administrative agency
decision. If the AA's choice is within the zone of discretion allowed by
the Supreme Court (BSI±d) the appeals court leaves the administrative
agency's choice alone. If the administrative agency's choice of policy is
not within the zone of discretion (BSI±d), the appeals court may move
the choice anywhere within the zone of discretion.
Stage 4: H, S, and P may revise the policy outcome.
To see how this game works, consider Figure 1. On the policy axis are
arrayed the ideal positions of the House, appeals court, administrative agency,
Senate, and president.
20. On statutory interpretation, see FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 9; William N. Eskridge,
Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 609 (1990); McNollgast, Positive Canons: The
Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation 80 GEO. L.J. 705 (1992); McNollgast, The Use of
Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 3 (Winter 1994);
Merrill, supra note 5.
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FIGURE 1
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equilibrium
outcome
level of deference
I I I d-ldI II POLICYH AC AA A BSI S P
equilibrium
policy outcome
The Best Statutory Interpretation and the zone of discretion (BSI±d) have also
been placed in figure 1. The ideal points of Justices 1, 2, and 3 are placed in the
two-dimensional plane. Now consider the subgame comprised of stages 2
through 4. At stage 4 any outcome between H and P will be a structure-induced
equilibrium. At stage 3, the AC's strategy will depend on whether AA has
chosen a policy within BSI±d. If so, AC has no choice at all, and the AA's policy
choice will survive to become the final outcome of the subgame. Hence, assume
that AA has not chosen a policy within BSI±d. In that case, AC can do best by
choosing the policy within BSI±d that is closest to AC's ideal point-BSI-d. In
stage 2, AA will maximize its own utility21 by choosing BSI-d, and that will be
the subgame equilibrium outcome. The equilibrium outcome on the plane has
been placed at the point (BSI-d, d).
The analysis of the subgame can be repeated for different values of d, each
time producing a different equilibrium outcome and an associated point in the
plane. Figure 2 shows ten such subgame equilibrium points. Discretion levels
are labeled one through ten as d1 through dl0 on the y axis and the associated
21. If there is even e disutility to being reversed, AA will prefer to choose BSI-d rather than have
AC choose it.
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equilibrium outcomes labeled, el through el0, are placed in the plane. Note that
once the level of BSI-d is less than AA, increasing the amount of discretion does
not change the subgame equilibrium policy outcome. If the agency has enough
discretion to choose its own ideal point, it will do so; further increasing the
amount of discretion it has will not change the agency's behavior.
FIGURE 2
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d4-
d3 -
d 2 -
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e o
•e
9
* e
8
o e
7
0 e
6
o e
e €
3
I I I I I I
H AC AA BSI S P
Policy
Now, consider the preferences of each individual Justice at stage 1 of the
game. For each level of deference the Justice might consider, there is an
associated policy equilibrium. Because the Justice has preferences over both of
these dimensions, he or she must consider both dimensions. In Figure 3, we have
placed Justice 3, along with his or her circular indifference curves P, P2, and P3-
Justice 3 would prefer to choose that level of deference that corresponds to the
equilibrium point that is closest to his or her ideal point. In Figure 3, that level
is represented by the point of tangency between 1 2 and the locus of subgame
equilibrium points, and discretion level d9 will generate that outcome.
[Vol. 57: No. 2
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FIGURE 3
Defer
H AC AA BSI S P
If Justice 3 were to be allowed to pick the level of deference alone, he or she
would pick d9. Justice 3 does not, however, have that power. Instead, the level
of deference is chosen by majority rule of the Justices on the Supreme Court.
Figure 4 places the ideal points of Justices 2 and 1,' and indicates their most
preferred levels of discretion. Justice 2 prefers d2, while Justice 1 would prefer
d0-no discretion at all. We can find the outcome of this majority rule vote by
using Black's median voter theorem. 2 Justice 2's preference, d2, will prevail,
and the point indicated as "Policy Equilibrium" will be the outcome on the
policy dimension. This completes the game.
22. There is nothing fundamentally different about a three judge and a nine judge court in public
choice theoretic terms.
23. Note that the Justices' preferences are all single-peaked along the deference dimension.
Policy
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FIGURE 4
-- -1
H AC
Policy
BSI S P
Policy
Equlibrium
Note several things about this game. First, the role of the Supreme Court is
restricted to management of the appeals court. (We have implicitly assumed that
certiorari is prohibitively costly for any given case.) Second, the preferences of
all of the actors except the Justices of the Supreme Court are restricted to the
policy axis. The Justices of the Supreme Court care both about deference and
policy, while everyone else cares only about policy.24 Third, some Justices
might vote for levels of deference that are very different from the level of
deference indicated by their ideal points. In our example, Justice 2 voted for d2,
while his or her ideal point indicates a much higher level of deference.
24. This is probably realistic for the purely political actors. However, for the administrative
agencies and the appeals courts, this might be a bit of a stretch. Since neither the agencies nor the
appeals courts can do much of anything about the levels of deference, however, they might well be
prompted to act as if they had preferences only along the policy axis.
Defer
d =
status quo
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2. 1981. We think the x axis in Figure 4 presents a fair characterization of the
situation at the beginning of the Reagan Administration. The House was liberal,
the President very conservative, and the Senate, which had fallen into Republi-
can control, was also relatively conservative. The courts of appeals, infused by
many new Carter appointees, were fairly liberal, as were the leftover Carter
administrative agencies. The ideal points of the Justices represent a lot of
guesswork. The policy preferences seem mildly unobjectionable. Listing the
median Justice, J2, as a moderate/conservative (Potter Stewart, for example)
seems right. But the preferences of the Justices over the deference dimension
are largely guesswork, generated quite frankly by the need to make the model
work with the facts of Chevron.
What predictions does this model produce? First, administrative agencies
should be interpreting statutory language in a fairly liberal manner, although not
as liberally as some might like. Second, the newly elected, conservative
President should be unhappy about it.
3. 1984 and Chevron. By 1984, the situation facing the Supreme Court had
changed significantly. By this time, the Supreme Court was reviewing cases from
administrative agencies that had become considerably more conservative. 5 This
shift in the position of administrative agencies led to an immediate shift in the
interpretation of statutes and more conservative policy outcomes. Figure 5
depicts these changes. The administrative agency's ideal point has moved from
AA to AA', and the agency has reinterpreted the statute from BSI-d to BSI+d.
This produces a new status quo just prior to the Chevron case. The rightward
shift in the agency's ideal point also produced an entirely new set of subgame
equilibrium points in the plane. In Figure 5, the old set of subgame equilibrium
points is indicated by the dashed line, while the new set of subgame equilibrium
points is indicated by the solid line.
The Supreme Court Justices must deal with this new status quo and set of
subgame equilibrium points when deciding upon the appropriate level of
deference. A new level of deference will be found in much the same way that
d2 was determined before AA moved right. Each Justice will determine his or
her ideal point on the set of subgame equilibrium points, and then derive his or
her ideal level of discretion. The level of discretion will be selected by a
majority rule vote of all of the Justices.
Figure 6 sketches an outline of the Chevron decision. The figure presents the
ideal points of Justices 1, 2, and 3, and indicates the indifference curve for each
Justice that passes through the status quo just before Chevron. It also shows the
projections of the Justices' ideal points onto the set of subgame equilibrium
25. Our model builds in a three-year lag in Supreme Court behavior, implicitly assuming that the
Supreme Court responds to the cases it must hear, rather than reports of changes in administrative
agency behavior reported in the newspapers. See infra part III.C.
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points. The derived level of deference-that preferred by the median Jus-
tice26-is indicated in Figure 6 as dcheon. The figure indicates the new equilibri-
um outcome, which produces somewhat more conservative policy outcomes than
did the status quo ante.
The indifference curves in Figure 6 reveal that all of the Justices prefer the
new equilibrium to the status quo ante. Hence, one might expect27 the Chevron
decision to have been unanimous.
FIGURE 5
Defer
old set of subgane
equilibrium points
new set of subgame
equilibrium points
status quo after
- - -AA reinterprets statute,
7 but before new court decision
I I
AC AA
• 1 . I. . . Policy
S PI
26. In this example, that would be either Justice 1 or Justice 3, for they seem to agree on the level
of deference.
27. This presumes honest voting by the Justices in a vote comparing the status quo ante (d) to
Chevron (dc,,,).
d 2-
old 7
equilibrium
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FIGURE 6
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4. Institutional Background. The rational choice model has roots in a
recent article by Professor Peter Strauss,' in which he investigates the effects
of the Supreme Court's relationship with lower federal courts and administrative
agencies on administrative law. In particular, Strauss suggests that "the Court's
opinions on the merits may be influenced by its management dilemmas. It may
choose outcomes that tend to make its control over the appellate courts more
effective; or that tend to reduce the opportunities those courts might enjoy for
adventurism free of close supervision by the Court."'29 Strauss's analysis stresses
28. Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1987).
29. Id. at 1095.
Policy
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uniformity and rule of law values, and does not delve into the Court's political
manipulation of the other branches of government. In these regards, his analysis
differs greatly from ours. Strauss's focus on the Supreme Court's task of
controlling the courts of appeals' review of agencies is, however, very similar.
Recall that in our model the Supreme Court does not, in general, decide cases.
Instead, the Supreme Court chooses a level of deference that the appellate courts
apply to the administrative agency.
Consider as an example the case of Rust v. Sullivan' within the context of
our rational choice model. Congress enacted Title X of the Public Health
Service Act"1 in 1970, providing federal money for "family-planning services."32
The Secretary of Health and Human Services was authorized to "make grants to
and enter into contracts with public or nonprofit private entities to assist in the
establishment and operation of voluntary family planning projects which shall
offer a broad range of acceptable and effective family planning methods and
services. ' 33  The Public Health Service Act also contained a very important
constraint: "none of the funds appropriated under this subchapter shall be used
in programs where abortion is a method of family planning. '
In 1988 the Secretary of Health and Human Services issued regulations
excluding all postconceptual care, including abortion counseling or referral, from
the definition of "family planning., 35  Some recipients of Title X funds sued
Secretary of Health and Human Services Louis Sullivan, claiming (among other
things) that his interpretation of Title X was wrong. Justice Rehnquist, writing
for a five to four majority, applied Chevron to the question of statutory
interpretation. Neither statutory language nor legislative history resolved the
question of whether abortion counseling and referral was part of "family
planning.', 36 The Secretary's interpretation was held permissible, considering
all of the circumstances. 7
30. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
31. Pub. L. No. 91-572, § 6, 84 Stat. 1504, 1506 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-
300a-41 (1988)).
32. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. at 1770.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 300(a) (1988).
34. Id. § 300a-6.
35. "Title X project[s] may not provide counselling concerning the use of abortion as a method of
family planning or provide referral for abortion as a method of family planning." Grants for Family
Planning Services, 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1) (1992). The Secretary also issued regulations requiring
complete physical and financial segregation between Title X family planning programs and affiliated
entities that provide abortion counseling or services. Id. § 59.9.
36. Our model builds in a three-year lag in Supreme Court behavior, implicitly assuming that the
Supreme Court responds to the cases it must hear, rather than reports of changes in administrative
agency behavior reported in the newspapers, etc. See infra Part III.C.
37. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. at 1770-71. Justice Blackmun, writing for the dissent, invoked the canon of
statutory construction that statutes are to be construed so as to avoid serious constitutional issues.
Because there were serious First and Fifth Amendment challenges to these regulations, claimed Justice
Blackmun, the statute should be construed to prohibit the regulations. Id. at 1780-86. Justice Rehnquist
avoided this argument by asserting "[t]here is no question that the statutory prohibition ... is
constitutional." Id. at 1772.
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Rust provides an illustration of the model. A conservative Supreme Court
used Chevron to compel deference to a conservative department of Health and
Human Services. The court of appeals deferred, but little can be inferred from
that fact. The court of appeals may merely have deferred because it was clear
(or seemed so) that Chevron compelled deference. Or the court of appeals may
have deferred because it agreed with the Secretary's statutory construction. In
any event, the theoretical effect of Chevron should be clear-Chevron allowed
the Secretary of Health and Human Services to make very conservative policy,
free of any possible revision by the court of appeals.
5. Problems in the Rational Choice Model. Although the rational choice
model does a much better job than the Eskridge and Ferejohn model of
representing the Chevron doctrine and explaining why the Supreme Court would
adopt the doctrine, the rational choice model has some serious problems.
a. Ideal points. The result depends crucially upon the arrangement of the actors
and statutory language. There are two crucial features. First, by 1984, the
relative positions of statutory language and administrative agency ideal points
must change. In 1981, the administrative agency must prefer points more liberal
than statutory language, and by 1984 must prefer points more conservative than
the statutory language. Although it is possible to think of obvious examples
where this is true (for example, the Civil Rights Division of the Justice
Department), it is by no means obvious that the condition was true in general.
Second, the results are quite sensitive to the Supreme Court Justices' preferenc-
es. Small alterations in the Justices' willingness to trade process for policy would
reduce the accuracy of the model's predictions."
b. The role of courts of appeals. The model fails to give an important enough
role to courts of appeals. In equilibrium the administrative agency's statutory
interpretation is not reversed. What is more, the agency's statutory interpreta-
tion is not affected by the location of the court of appeals in the model. This is
probably wrong, as a factual matter. The courts of appeals, after all, make
occasional forays into statutory interpretation, pulling the interpretation away
from more likely interpretations of the words and legislative history of the
interpreted act.39
If we were to rework the model to give a more prominent place to courts of
appeals, we would give the Supreme Court additional reasons to mandate great
38. It is difficult, in general, to deduce ideal points of the Justices from their opinions about either
process or policy. The Justices have preferences over both dimensions and must be willing, at times, to
trade one in favor of the other. Conservative Justices who give agencies substantial deference must
tolerate some uses of discretion in a liberal direction. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S.
574 (1983). It is this phenomenon, in part, that leads us to model the courts of appeals as responsive
to large numbers of decisions from the Supreme Court. See infra Part III.C. (discussing signals from the
Supreme Court to the courts of appeals).
39. See McNollgast, supra note 20.
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deference whenever the distance between the preferences of courts of appeals
and the Supreme Court were to grow large. The production of such a model,
however, must await future work.
c. Biased zones of discretion. The model presumes that when the Supreme
Court chooses a level of deference, d, the resulting zone of discretion is defined
by BSI±d. The zone of discretion is centered at BSI. It is possible to produce
alternative formulations in which the Supreme Court selected zones of discretion
that were not centered at BSI. For example, in 1981, the Supreme Court might
have tried to define a zone of discretion (BSI, BSI+2d). Such a zone would have
the same width, but would be biased to the right. If the Supreme Court had
adopted such a rule in 1981, it would not have had to decide Chevron; the
existing zone of discretion would have included the equilibrium point under
Chevron.
We think our model of zones of discretion centered at BSI captures a natural
institutional feature of administrative law. It is difficult for a court to announce
a rule of process that is contingent on the political direction in which the agency
exercises discretion. A decision that said "administrative agencies are more
democratically accountable than courts if and only if the agencies exercise their
discretion to interpret statutes in a conservative direction" would be laughable.
Courts, we assert, try to avoid being laughingstocks. Hence, zones of discretion
centered at BSI, coupled with adjustments in the degree of deference, is the best
the Supreme Court can do.
d. Control of Deference by Congress and President. The model neglects control
of the level of deference, d, by H, S, and P. To the extent that the level of
deference is a prudential rather than a constitutional rule, H, S, and P could
revise the level of deference through an ordinary statute. Section 706 of the
Administrative Procedure Act seems to suggest that H, S, and P have instructed
the Supreme Court to give no deference to administrative statutory interpreta-
tions.' These instructions could be reiterated or modified; the Bumpers
Amendment 4' attempted to reinforce and extend the rule of no deference, but
failed to gain passage. The model implicitly assumes that such techniques of
controlling the Supreme Court's choice of deference are ineffective, or so costly
as to preclude effective use. Future models could relax this assumption, and
derive the behavior of H, S, and P as part of an equilibrium.
e. Certiorari. The model of certiorari is extremely primitive; certiorari is never
granted and the Court never hears any case on the merits. The Court has been
modeled in this way to emphasize its supervisory role over the courts of appeals.
40. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988) ("[T]he reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law [and]
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions .... ").
41. S. 1080, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
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In fact, as emphasized in part III of this article, the Supreme Court must grant
certiorari to some cases in order to signal the appropriate level of deference to
the courts of appeals.
The next step is to produce a model including a better representation of
certiorari that explains why the Supreme Court would decide Chevron as it did.
There are several existing models of the certiorari process that might do the trick,
the most promising of which were produced by Pablo Spiller and Edward
Schwartz.42 Producing such a model must wait for future research.
C. A Third Explanation-Logrolling
The third potential explanation regards Chevron as an elaborate logroll
between various members of the Court. The logrolling explanation is far less
satisfactory than the mixed process and policy rational choice model described
above. Nevertheless, we include the logrolling model for two reasons. First, and
most important, the logrolling model explains the generality of legal doctrines in
a new and important way. Although the logrolling explanation of Chevron may
be less than compelling, the logrolling model may apply with more force to other
doctrines. Second, we intend this article to include a current catalog of rational
choice type explanations for Chevron, and the logrolling explanation certainly
belongs in the catalog.
The logrolling explanation presumes at least the following: there is more
than one type of administrative agency. At the very least there are executive
branch agencies, and independent administrative agencies. There are some
systematic differences between executive branch and independent agencies. For
example, the president has the inherent right to fire heads of executive branch
agencies, but most heads of independent agencies that have protection from
being fired under the terms of their statute cannot be summarily dismissed by the
president. In another example, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498, subjecting
new administrative rulings to cost/benefit analysis, have been applied only to
executive branch agencies. 43 These differences should be enough to give the
president more effective control over the behavior and preferences of the
executive branch agencies.
Next, we presume that the various members of the Court have different
preferences over the different functions performed by independent and executive
agencies. In particular, we must presume that there are three groups of Justices
whose preferences can be represented by the following chart.
42. Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory of Certiorari: Hierarchy, Strategy and Decision
Costs at the Courts, Faculty Working Paper 91-0110, Political Economy Series #44 (Department of
Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign); Edward P. Schwartz, Information, Agendas,
and the Rule of Four: Nonmajoritarian Certiorari Rules for the Supreme Court (Harvard University
Center for American Political Studies, Occasional Paper 93-10/April 1993).
43. For an insightful introduction to these matters, see Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management
of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 533 (1989).
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ISSUES
Independent Executive
Agencies Agencies
Justices
A 10 1
B -2 2
C -1 -10
The chart shows the utilities of Justices A, B, and C for moderate (as opposed
to conservative) interpretations of statutes controlling independent administrative
agencies and executive branch agencies.
The chart shows that the Justices in group A strongly prefer moderate, rather
than conservative, interpretations of statutes governing independent administra-
tive agencies. These same Justices have a very mild preference for a moderate,
rather than conservative, interpretation of statutes governing executive branch
administrative agencies. Justices in group B prefer conservative interpretations
of independent administrative agency statutes and moderate interpretations of
executive branch agency statutes. Justices in group C prefer conservative
interpretations of both independent and executive branch agencies, but have a
much stronger preference for the conservative interpretations of executive
agencies. If all Justices vote their preferences honestly, then we will get
conservative interpretations of independent administrative agency statutes
(because Justices in groups B and C will vote this way) and moderate interpreta-
tions of executive branch agency statutes (because Justices in groups A and B
will vote this way). Justices in groups A and C, however, can agree to exchange
votes, with the group A Justices promising to vote for a conservative interpreta-
tion of executive branch agency statutes, and the Justices in group C promising
to vote for a moderate interpretation of independent agency statutes. Such a
trade makes Justices in groups A and C better off, while Justices in group B are
losers."
There are several impediments to such a direct vote trade, however. First,
open vote trading may violate norms of appropriate behavior on the Court.
There is precious little evidence of naked vote trading on the Supreme Court.
Second, such a trade would invite cheating, for some Justices would have to
perform first, as cases came before the Court. Other Justices would then be
strongly tempted to cheat on the agreement, hiding their defections behind false
disagreements about whether statutory language will support particular
interpretations. The agreement would quickly unravel. The problems with
cheating, however, could be ameliorated in a couple of ways. To the extent that
the Justices have preferences over broad classes of rules, rather than over
outcomes for individuals in particular cases, the Justices can bundle different
44. Such a trade, of course, is not stable. Justices in group B can try to woo Justices in either of
the other groups.
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cases in the same term together for decision on the same day. Also, "bright-
line" rules, such as the rule of trimesters adopted in Roe v. Wade,' could
reduce opportunities for post-trade cheating. Nevertheless, trading retains
significant problems from cheating.
Third, there would often be real social costs involved in alternative statutory
interpretations, and only an expert agency would know what the costs were.
Supreme Court Justices would not know when they should be willing to let
expertise trump politics.
The Chevron doctrine could be the Court's attempt to effectuate this vote
trade and solve some of the problems. A doctrine of deference is not a naked
vote trade and, therefore, would not violate basic norms of judicial behavior.'
Such a doctrine would reduce cheating, in theory, because it announces a rule to
cover all cases at once. Last, because the interpretation of statutes is delegated
to the "expert" administrative agencies created under the statutes, the Justices
do not have to worry about whether an expert would decide to let expertise
trump politics. The experts have already spoken, and spoken within the political
context of legislative and executive oversight.
What are the main problems with this explanation? There is no evidence
that judicial preferences are aligned in the way needed to make this explanation
work. In fact, there are several arguments cutting the other way. First, there are
so many executive and independent agencies, covering so many different types
of matters, that it would be surprising to find that preferences array across this
dimension. Second, if the explanation is right, there should be a group of
Justices (such as those in group B) opposed to Chevron. Chevron, however, was
unanimous.47
The unanimity issue could be handled in a couple of different ways within the
rational choice framework. First, Justices Marshall, Rehnquist, and O'Connor
45. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
46. Many commentators acknowledge the bargaining that takes place with respect to the writing
of opinions. This phenomenon could be regarded as a form of logrolling, subject to some sort of
germaneness (for example, "case or controversy" limitations on dicta in federal courts) restraint.
47. The argument could be retrofitted to respond to these two objections. If there were three types
of administrative agencies, covering three types of issues, and three groups of Justices with preferences
like the following, a three way logroll would be possible.
Types of Agency
Issues
1 2 3
Justices
A -1 -1 10
B -1 10 -1
C 10 -1 -1
All Justices could agree to vote for all three issues, and all would be better off. If each type of
administrative agency happened to be under political control such that it would perform appropriately,
the Justices could adopt Chevron. Of course, there are opportunities for any two groups of Justices to
invent some new doctrine that gives them what they want at the expense of the third group of Justices.
The main problem with such a formulation is that no natural array of issues and agencies suggests
itself in accord with this model.
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did not participate in the opinion. They might represent the missing Justices.
Second, perhaps we should not trust the apparent unanimity of opinions released
in June. Justices eager to get to vacation might sign onto opinions with which
they actually disagree. Unfortunately, neither approach has much power. First,
Marshall, Rehnquist, and O'Connor seem much more like individual representa-
tives from three distinct groups, rather than a single group. Second, the missing
Justices have, in subsequent cases, ratified the Chevron approach.' Hence, we
will take the unanimity of Chevron seriously in this article.
The unanimity issue can also be handled by going outside of the rational
choice framework. If the Justices in groups A and C convinced the Justices in
group B of the institutional and jurisprudential appeal of the Chevron doctrine,
then these Justices might have been persuaded to vote for the doctrine despite
its tendency to give group B Justices less preferred outcomes. Ultimately, this
leads back to the mixed process and policy public choice model in part II.A.2.
of this article.
Last, Chevron does not cure the cheating problem. If the administrative
regulation is patently unreasonable (outside the zone of discretion), the Court
may do what it likes with the statute. In addition, if the statute is "clear," there
is no discretion. Both of these issues within the Chevron doctrine allow Justices
to give agencies no deference, thereby cheating on the deal.
In sum, we have suggested three ways to explain Chevron. First, the Chevron
doctrine might be the product of genuine judicial preference for institutional
roles. Second, Chevron might be a rational response by Supreme Court Justices
to the Court's inability to review any significant portion of the output of the
courts of appeals. Third, Chevron might be a type of logroll between different
groups of Justices. Each solution to the Chevron puzzle has its problems, but we
regard the second explanation as the most likely.
III
THE EMPIRICAL EFFECT OF CHEVRON
In this section we first review the results of Schuck and Elliott,49 and of
Merrill.' We then develop a model of Supreme Court signaling and present
calculations of the implicit deference level in Supreme Court decisions. The
section concludes with a discussion of how our results relate to the rational actor
model of the judiciary discussed in part II.
48. See, e.g., Pauly v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc. 111 S. Ct. 2524 (1991); American Hosp. Ass'n. v.
NLRB, 111 S. Ct. 1539 (1991); Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. v. United Distribution
Cos., 498 U.S. 211 (1991).
49. Schuck & Elliott, supra note 10.
50. Merrill, supra note 5.
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A. Schuck and Elliott
In To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative
Law,51 Peter Schuck and Donald Elliott read federal administrative law cases
from four different eras in recent United States history.52 During the periods
studied, the federal courts' caseload of administrative law cases decided on the
merits more than tripled, from 489 cases in 1965 to 1567 cases in 1987."3 The
overall federal caseload grew even faster than the administrative portion,
however, so the percentage of administrative law cases decided on the merits
declined significantly from 1965 (sixteen percent) to 1987 (seven percent).'
Perhaps in response to the growth in caseload, the federal courts relied
increasingly on "table decisions." Table decisions are listed in the Federal
Reporter and give only the names of the parties, disposition, docket number,
date, and name of institution from which appeal was taken. No opinion is
provided." Schuck and Elliott could get no firm number or percentage of table
decisions for 1965. In 1975, twenty-nine percent of their sample were table
decisions. By 1985, fully sixty percent were table decisions. Schuck and Elliott
noted that some of their findings were affected by whether or not the table
decisions were included.56
Schuck and Elliott proceeded to analyze a number of other trends in such
variables as the length and footnoting of opinions,57 the fragmentation of
decisions,58 the affirmance rate for administrative law decisions,59 and the types
of agencies involved in the proceedings.6' They found that the mix of agencies
involved in adjudication changed radically from 1965 to 1985. In 1965, the
NLRB and the Patent and Trademark Office accounted for sixty-one percent of
the total caseload, but by 1985 they accounted for only twenty-two percent. The
Merit Systems Protection Board, which did not exist in 1965, accounted for
51. Schuck & Elliott, supra note 10.
52. They sampled opinions from 6-month periods in 1965, 1974-75, 1984 (just before Chevron), and
in 1985 (just after Chevron), and from a 2-month period in 1988. Their datat provides a wealth of insight
on some of the most basic questions in administrative law: How many administrative law cases are
there? What percentages of the overall federal caseload do they represent? Which agencies are most
commonly sued? Who tends to win the cases? We will review only as much of their findings as we think
is necessary to understand and extend their specific findings about the effect of Chevron.
53. There was a similar growth in the number of appeals from administrative action filed in the
federal courts-,106 cases filed in 1965 to 3,179 filings in 1985. Schuck & Elliott, supra note 10, at 997-
98.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1000. Schuck and Elliott report that sometimes memoranda are provided to the parties,
and that some of these memoranda can be obtained through LEXIS or WESTLAW.
56. Because our extension of the Schuck and Elliott data uses only Supreme Court opinions, we
do not include the Supreme Court analogue of table decisions---summary disposition.
57. Schuck & Elliott, supra note 10, at 1003-04.
58. Id. at 1004-07.
59. Schuck and Elliott's data seem to show a rising rate of affirmance, while data from the
administrative office suggest a fluctuating rate. lId at 1007-13.
60. Schuck and Elliott found that in 1965, adjudications accounted for 93% of all cases, and that
by 1984-85 adjudications had fallen to "only" 87% of the codable decisions. Ratemakings and
rulemakings rose, respectively, from 1.4% and 0.3% in 1965 to 5% and 7% in 1984-85. Id at 1013-15.
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27.5% of the caseload by 1985, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service
took 13.7%.61 Schuck and Elliott also determined that the new federal circuit
takes the lion's share of appeals from administrative action (36%), and that the
D.C. Circuit's share has fluctuated (11.6% in 1965, to 22.7% in 1975, to 12.4%
in 1984/85).62
Schuck and Elliott also examined the extent to which the Chevron opinion
altered the rate at which lower federal courts would affirm administrative action.
Their null hypothesis was that Chevron would make no difference. Having
"been educated ... in the shadow of the Legal Realist tradition,"63 they
believed that the Chevron doctrine was malleable enough to let courts of appeals
do whatever they wanted. Schuck and Elliott first tested their hypothesis by
calculating the overall outcome rates (affirmed, reversed, remanded, or other)
before and immediately after Chevron. The results are in the Table 1, below.
TABLE 1
1984 1985
percent percent
Affirmed 523 70.9% 763 81.3%
Reversed 106 14.4% 77 8.2%
Remanded 106 14.4% 87 9.3%
Other 25 3.4% 54 5.8%
Total 760 981
Schuck and Elliott concluded that the distribution of outcomes after Chevron was
different from the distribution of outcomes before Chevron at a confidence level
of less than .01.'
Schuck and Elliott also tested the distribution of doctrinal reason for
outcomes-the question closest to the heart of the Chevron inquiry.' The
Chevron doctrine addressed only the question of deference to an administrative
agency's construction of its own statute, not issues of procedural regularity,
factfinding, or exercise of discretion. Schuck and Elliott coded all remanded
administrative law cases just prior to and just after Chevron into five groups:
"(1) remands for errors of substantive law; (2) remands for errors of procedural
law; (3) remands for lack of adequate factual support; (4) remands for lack of
adequate explanation; and (5) remands for which no basis is given for the court's
action (for example table decisions)."'
In sum, there was a dramatic drop in law-substance based remands, coupled
with a rise in all other categories. If one recodes the data as (1) law-substance
61. Id. at 1015-16.
62. Id. at 1019.
63. Id. at 1026.
64. Id. at 1030.
65. Id. at 1032-36.
66. Id. at 1032-33.
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reasons and (2) all other reasons, and then computes a chi square test on the
hypothesis that the pattern of reasons of remands is unchanged by Chevron, the
null hypothesis can be rejected at a ninety-five percent confidence level.67
TABLE 2
REASON FOR REMAND
1984 1985
Law-Substance 38 35.8% 19 21.8%
Law-Procedure 16 15.1% 15 17.2%
Fact-Based 30 28.3% 28 32.2%
Rationale 19 17.9% 18 20.7%
Unstated 19 17.9% 20 23.0%
Total 122 115% 100 115%
Schuck and Elliott interpret the two results, fewer remands and a smaller
percentage of remands based on legal substance, as disconfirming their legal
realist presuppositions. They then pushed on to test the permanence of the
Chevron effect by replicating the measures reported above on a two-month
sample of appellate cases from March and April 1988.' They had no firm
hypothesis about the long-term effects of Chevron. Lower federal courts might
be a bit like children, reacting immediately to a stimulus, such as the sharply
worded opinion in Chevron, but then quickly forgetting about the event and
behaving as if it had never happened. Or perhaps unspecified institutional
considerations produce regression to the historical mean rates of affirmance and
remands based on substantive legal grounds. Last, it is possible that decisions
subsequent to Chevron have changed the law.69 On the other hand, Chevron's
effects might be persistent. The results, reported in Table 3, are a bit mixed.
TABLE 3
1988 # %
Affirmed 111 75.5%
Reversed 12 8.2%
Remanded 25 17.0%
Other 3 2.0%
Total 151 102.72%
67. Id. at 1034.
68. I& at 1038.
69. See, e.g., NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112 (1987); INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
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Obviously, the affirmance rate dipped, while the remand rate increased rather
dramatically. (Schuck and Elliott did not compute data on the reasons for
remands because there were too few to generate any meaningful comparisons
with 1985.) In their overall conclusion, Schuck and Elliott wrote:
Within a few months after Chevron, the affirmance rate rose substantially, while
reversals and remands decreased almost equally to account for the increased
affirmance rate. Over the longer term, however, remands gradually returned to,
and then exceeded, their pre-Chevron levels, eroding about half of the increase
in affirmances that Chevron had produced. °
Finally, Schuck and Elliott investigated whether or not the different circuits
behaved differently. They found that the D.C. Circuit seems to behave
somewhat independently of the Supreme Court's Chevron decision, but that the
other circuits paid close attention, at least for a while.
TABLE 4
PERCENT AFFIRMED
D.C. Cmc. vs. ALL FED
1965 1975 1984 1985 1988
DC Cir 46.5 60.6 58.6 52.6 61.5
All Fed 55.1 60.3 70.9 81.3 75.5
Schuck and Elliott regard their data as broadly confirming a Chevron effect,
at least in courts other than the D.C. Circuit, and they are almost certainly
correct. In fact, their work is extremely important, not only because it
establishes a broad Chevron effect, but also because their article proposes that
one should care about whether or not administrative law cases have any effect.
Because their data were not constructed with our models in mind, there are some
problems with using them in our article. First, the data gathered were targeted
at a somewhat broader notion of the Chevron doctrine than the one upon which
we focus. Recall that Chevron orders reviewing courts to give an administrative
agency deference with regard to statutory interpretations, as long as the
interpretations are within some zone of reasonableness. Ideally, to test the
hypothesis that Chevron increased courts of appeals' deference, given the
assumption that everything except the doctrine stayed constant, one would first
collect cases pre- and post-Chevron in which the federal courts reviewed
administrative agency interpretations of statutes. Next, one would compare the
rate of deference to statutory construction before Chevron to the rate of
deference after Chevron. The "no effect" hypothesis is that the rates should be
equal. The alternative hypothesis, that Chevron affected federal court behavior,
states that the rate of deference should rise after Chevron.
70. Schuck & Elliott, supra note 10, at 1040-41.
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Unfortunately, Schuck and Elliott did not perform the appropriate
comparison. They did compare rates of statutory/substance based remands
before and after Chevron. But this comparison has two serious defects. First,
there is no reason to restrict the test to remands. An administrative agency's
statutory construction may have been rejected in the many cases that were
affirmed or reversed. Second, Schuck and Elliott do not indicate how many
statutory constructions were upheld.
The second problem derives from the large number of second and third order
reactions to any Supreme Court decision. When the Supreme Court adjusts
deference with a Chevron-type doctrine, many things may happen. As Schuck
and Elliott point out, federal courts may adjust the way in which other aspects
of administrative cases are reviewed.71 Further, administrative agencies may
adjust their behavior by bringing different cases, pushing different rulemakings,
and altering their own statutory interpretations. The Supreme Court may adjust
its review of lower federal courts by changing its certiorari practices. And, over
the long run, Congress and the president may change their actions by writing
statutes differently, changing oversight, and appointing different administrators.
We discuss some of these factors in part C, below.
B. Merrill's Data
Thomas Merrill analyzed Supreme Court decisions reviewing statutory
interpretations by administrative agencies from 1981 to 1990. He produced the
following two tables:
TABLE 5
PRE- CHEVRON TERMS
A B F
Total Cases Involving Agency View Cases Citing
Term Deference Question Accepted Traditional Factors
1983 19 13 (68%) 11(57%)
1982 15 11(73%) 11(73%)
1981 11 10 (90%) 8 (73%)
Total 45 34 (75%) 30 (66%)
71. Id. at 1028-29.
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TABLE 6
POST- CHEVRON TERMS
A B C D E F
Total Cases Chevron Framework: Cases
Involving Agency Agency View Framework Citing
Deference View Framework Decided Traditional
Term Question Accepted Applied Accepted Step 2 Factor
1990 11 8 (73%) 6 (55%) 4 (66%) 2 (33%) 6 (55%)
1989 14 8 (57%) 9 (62%) 4 (44%) 2 (25%) 4 (29%)
1988 9 4 (44%) 3 (33%) 1 (33%) 1 (33%) 6 (66%)
1987 14 9 (64%) 5 (36%) 3 (60%) 3 (50%) 3 (21%)
1986 9 5 (55%) 2 (22%) 1 (50%) 1 (50%) 2 (22%)
1985 14 11(78%) 6 (43%) 5 (83%) 4 (66%) 6 (43%)
1984 19 18 (94%) 1 (5%) 1 (100%) 1 (100%) 7 (35%)
Total 90 63 (70%) 32 (36%) 19 (59%) 14 (44%) 34 (37%)
Merrill noted that the overall rate of deference appeared to have fallen after
Chevron. This result seemed counterintuitive for a case that ordered increased
deference. Second, Merrill noted that the Chevron approach was frequently
ignored in cases that should have followed it.
Merrill offered two basic explanations for the data. First, he suggested that
if one were faithfully to follow Chevron, the effect would be so distasteful that
even the Supreme Court would be unwilling to follow it consistently.72 Merrill
suggested that the Supreme Court decisions in the years immediately following
Chevron showed that the Court was even then unhappy with a strong deference
doctrine. Second, he hypothesized that the 1988 case K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc., revised the basic Chevron doctrine so as to provide far less deference to
agencies.74 He observed that in 1985-86, the rate of deference was rather high
(in eighteen of twenty-five cases), while from 1988 to 1990, the rate of
acceptance was much lower (in twenty of thirty-four cases).
Although Merrill's data were suggestive, they did not support his conclusions.
Because the cases reviewed by the Supreme Court change over time, the overall
Supreme Court uphold rates reveal little about changes in the Court's prefer-
ences for agency discretion and judicial deference. Ideally, one would want to
analyze each case and deduce the absolute level of desired deference implied by
its language. In practice, such a methodology is probably too subjective to be
useful. Nevertheless, we can make some progress if we distinguish between
several broad categories of cases.
First, by considering both the courts of appeals and Supreme Court actions
in each case, we can directly infer if the Supreme Court desires lower courts
either to increase or decrease the level of deference they grant to administrative
72. Merrill, supra note 5, at 983-84.
73. 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
74. Merrill, supra note 5, at 992.
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agencies. In Chevron, the appeals court reversed the government, while the
Supreme Court deferred to the government's statutory interpretation and
reversed the lower court. Taken together, the two courts' decisions imply that
the Supreme Court desired the lower courts to defer more to agency decisions.
Alternatively, in Rust v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court deferred to the administra-
tive agency, but the appeals court did as well. Because the Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court position, it did not issue a directive to lower courts to
change their standard of review.75
To move from relative levels of deference between the different courts to
changes in Supreme Court preferences requires further information about the
cases. We expect that over time both the cases presented to appeals courts and
appeals courts' decisions will change systematically. For example, if appeals
courts follow the guidance in Chevron, then their subsequent decisions will
incorporate more deference to administrative agencies. How should one
interpret a subsequent case with the same decision record as Chevron (where the
appeals court reverses the agency, and then the Supreme Court reverses the
lower court and upholds the agency)? Because of the higher base level of
deference, the Supreme Court would not be confirming Chevron, but rather
calling for still greater deference to administrative agencies. To interpret
Supreme Court decisions thus requires a model of judicial review that specifies
adjustments by agencies, appellants, and lower courts.
In the remainder of this section, we consider the administrative review
process in more detail and propose a method for unpacking Supreme Court
decisions to address the issues sketched above. Next, we characterize the pattern
of decisions that would be consistent with the model presented in section II. We
then recast in this framework a data set comparable to that used by Merrill. As
is discussed further below, the data are incomplete for our purposes; consequent-
ly our conclusions are preliminary and serve primarily to demonstrate the
methodology.
1. Administrative Reviews. In the following figure (Figure 7), we consider a
decision tree that characterizes six separate decisions culminating in a Supreme
Court administrative law case. In step one, the agency issues its final decision.76
The agency decides in favor of some party; its decision defines the government
position for the subsequent steps in the judicial review. The losing party (who
we call the "private party") decides the action at step two: whether or not to
appeal. In step three, the appeals court chooses to affirm the government or to
reverse the agency by ruling in favor of the private party. Step four is the
75. More precisely, the signal sent for deference in such a case is probably weaker than in the
Chevron situation. Sometimes the Court is implicitly reviewing a set of conflicting lower court decisions;
if so, then by affirming the case that deferred to the government, the Supreme Court at the same time
rejects alternate lower court decisions. The distinction made here provides a first cut at deducing
Supreme Court preferences.
76. This is, of course, a minimalist view of judicial review, and ignores the role of district courts,
table decisions, and numerous other potential actions.
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decision to seek Supreme Court review. The decision tree splits into two
branches at step four, depending on the decision of the appeals court. If the
government wins in the appeals court, then the step four decision to seek
certiorari is undertaken by the private party. If the private party wins at step
three, then the government must decide whether to appeal to the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court then has the two final moves. In step five, it decides
whether to grant certiorari. We call the cases on the left branch "cert affirm
cases," as certiorari is granted to a case where an appeals court affirmed the
government. The cases on the right branch are "cert reverse cases," where the
private party prevailed in the court of appeals. If certiorari is granted, then in
step six the Supreme Court decides either to uphold the government or to
reverse it.
The first problem in unpacking Supreme Court decisions is to determine
likely changes in the Court's caseload. To predict how the cases change, we
initially impose two assumptions which are relaxed in the subsequent discussion.
First, suppose that the courts of appeals are fully faithful to the rule of law, that
is, that they want to decide cases in complete accord with Supreme Court
directions. Second, assume that the Supreme Court can issue an unambiguous
signal, which is observed by all of the relevant parties in administrative cases and
appeals.
A central result from the economic analysis of suit, settlement, and trial is
that cases typically are filed only when the expected benefits-the likelihood of
winning times the benefits that result from success-exceed the costs of filing and
litigation, and the expected costs of losing. Priest and Klein' argue that civil
cases go to trial only when both sides have approximately equal expectations of
winning. Otherwise, they would settle and save litigation costs. Thus, whatever
standard is applied by the courts, in equilibrium the likelihood of success for
both parties is about fifty percent.
The same principle holds for administrative cases, although overall the
plaintiffs' likelihood of success is usually less than fifty percent. A lower
probability of success is still consistent with a rational pursuit of administrative
appeals. The benefits to plaintiffs from winning an administrative appeal can be
much greater than the litigation costs or the cost of losing, so winning large
benefits with a low probability of success may still exceed expected costs.
Furthermore, the plaintiff may benefit directly from initiating a suit, independent
of the probability of success. For example, the appeal may delay agency actions
or impose large costs on the defendants.
77. George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEG. STUD. 1
(1984).
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The preceding discussion implies that the actors' decisions in each of the first
four steps are based on their expectations about the ultimate outcome of the
game. The agency's decision will incorporate a level of discretion that it expects
to prevail ultimately. Appeal is undertaken at step two only if the private party
believes it has a reasonable chance of success in the courts, which depends on its
beliefs about the standard of deference that will be used by the judiciary. Next,
the appellate courts issue a decision at step three that reflects their beliefs about
Supreme Court preferences. Finally, at step four a certiorari appeal is
undertaken only if the government or private party believes its costs and efforts
for appeal are justified by the likelihood of success at the Supreme Court. Thus,
the cases that are present at each step-and those presented to the Supreme
Court for review-reflect the beliefs of each decisionmaker (agency, private
party, appeals court, appellant) about Supreme Court preferences, and are
expected to change if the Supreme Court announces a new standard of
review-for example, in the wake of Chevron.
2. Predicted Courts of Appeals Uphold Rates and Supreme Court Signals. The
process sketched out here has a lagged structure, owing to the timing of decisions
and appeals. The lags mean that adjustments take place sequentially; by taking
account of the sequencing, the effects of a change in Supreme Court preferences
can be inferred to some degree from observing the outcomes of cases rather than
analyzing their content. Suppose that Chevron does represent a signal from the
Supreme Court for greater judicial deference to administrative agencies, as
discussed in section II. What should happen to appeals courts' uphold rates
under the preceding assumptions?
Chevron should have approximately no impact on appellate uphold rates
during the term that the Supreme Court heard Chevron ("year 1"), as the
Court's decision was announced at the end of the term. During year 1, courts
of appeals will base their decisions on the pre-Chevron level of deference.
Furthermore, in year 1, neither the agency's actions at step one, nor those of the
private party at step two will reflect the Chevron policy change. Thus, the
caseload confronting courts of appeals in year 1 will be identical to the pre-
Chevron caseload, and their uphold rates in year 1 will be unaffected by the
change in policy.
The Chevron standard becomes effective in courts of appeals in the
subsequent term ("year 2"). Were the caseload identical, one would observe an
increase in the appeals courts uphold rate. However, we predict a partial
adjustment in the appellate caseload. First, a one-year lag between step one
(agency decisions) and step two (judicial appeal) is common, although not
universal. Thus, a fairly large share of the potential appeals available to private
parties at step two will be based on pre-Chevron agency expectations, and will
be identical to those of year 1. However, in year 2, the private parties, like the
appeals courts, have observed Chevron. As a result, plaintiffs in year 2 may
choose not to appeal some cases that they would have appealed in year 1.
Specifically, at step two, private parties will abandon appeals at a
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disproportionately high rate in cases where the agency has exercised a small
amount of discretion, thereby increasing the average level of discretion exercised
in administrative decisions reviewed by courts of appeals.
We do not expect the year 2 adjustment in courts of appeals' caseloads to be
complete. If some of the benefits to filing are independent of the likelihood of
success (that is, delaying agency actions), or if plaintiffs expended some of the
fixed costs of litigation prior to the announced change in policy at the end of
year 1, then some plaintiffs are likely to appeal cases even if they have a very
low probability of success. Hence, changes in the appellate caseload will not
fully compensate for the change in the deference policy, and courts of appeals'
uphold rates are expected to increase from year 1 to year 2.
By the subsequent year ("year 3"), all of the upstream actors will have had
time to adjust to the change in the Supreme Court's policy. Agencies will have
observed the change in the deference standard at the end of year 1. During year
2, they can be expected to take advantage of their increased latitude. As a
result, plaintiffs in year 3 will have as many opportunities to complain about
excessive exercise of discretion, relative to the new standard, as they had to
complain about in year 1, relative to the initial standard. Thus, the rational
adjustment model predicts that courts of appeals uphold rates in year 3 will have
declined to the year 1 level.
The final steps in the decision tree present additional challenges to the
analysis. The discussion above relates directly to step four: requests for
certiorari should follow the same adjustment path. The average level of
deference in year 2 certiorari appeals (appeals at step four) is expected to
increase, owing to year 2 adjustments in the beliefs of the appellants. But, as
with step 2 appeals, the opportunity set of cases that can be appealed (year 1
appellate decisions) is unchanged by Chevron. In year 3, cases appealed to the
Supreme Court reflect both the change in appellants' expectations and the
change in appeals courts' decisions in year 2. Finally, in year 4, the step four
appeals reflect full adjustments by all upstream actors. A problem with the
analysis, however, is presented by step five: the decision to grant certiorari.
While the appeals courts decide all cases presented to them, the Supreme Court
grants certiorari to a vanishingly small percentage of appeals. It is at this step
that the rational adjustment model loses some of its credibility, and should be
replaced by a more specific model that characterizes the conditions under which
the Supreme Court grants certiorari. Unfortunately, this exercise is beyond the
scope of this article. As a first cut, then, we ignore both step four and step five
adjustments, and instead presume that the cases heard by the Supreme Court are
representative of the decisions issued by appeals courts in the previous term.
Given this simplification, we can characterize the pattern of signals that the
Supreme Court issues to appeals courts-that is, requests for lower courts to
grant greater or lesser deference to administrative agencies. The Court requests
a change through its treatment of the appellate decisions under review during the
current term. In year 1, the Supreme Court issues its first signal for greater
deference. In year 2 the Supreme Court reviews appellate decisions from year
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1, which are based on pre-Chevron cases and a pre-Chevron appellate standard
of deference. The Supreme Court signal in year 2 should be identical to that of
year 1: greater deference relative to the appellate court decisions from year 1.
We should therefore expect two consecutive years of greater discretion signals
from a single change in the Supreme Court's desired level of allowable agency
discretion. If there is no further change in the Supreme Court's preferences, the
Supreme Court's signals in years 3 and 4 should be for no change in the level of
deference relative to the appellate decisions from years 2 and 3.
We cannot stress strongly enough one central point: the Supreme Court's
signals must be interpreted relative to the caseload in the federal appellate courts.
For example, we stated above that one should expect the courts of appeals'
uphold rates to decline in period 3 because of changes in the caseload coming
from the administrative agencies. A Court that desired a sustained increase in
the acceptable discretion level would request no shift in deference in year 4 when
reviewing year 3 cases from the courts of appeals. The superficial appear-
ance-that the Supreme Court was accepting a decrease in the acceptable level
of agency discretion-is completely misleading.
We started this discussion with two simplifying assumptions: (1) the signal is
unambiguous and (2) courts of appeals adjust fully to the new standard.
Relaxing these assumptions changes our predictions about signals and the
adjustment periods. First, suppose the Supreme Court's signal is somewhat
ambiguous. The appellate courts will be unsure of the new standard contained
in the Court's ambiguous signal. In response, the courts of appeals may apply
a greater deference standard only to cases that closely resemble those granted
certiorari. Because certiorari is limited, the Supreme Court may have to hear
cases over several years before it supplies a base of rulings broad enough to
cover the full range of cases before the appellate courts. As a result, the
Supreme Court may continue (ambiguously) to signal greater deference for three
or four years, and adjustments in courts of appeals' uphold rates, agency
decisions, and appellant decisions will take longer than is described above.
Second, suppose that courts of appeals do not fully adjust their rulings, even
if the Supreme Court's signal is unambiguous. If, as we hypothesize in part II,
courts of appeals are not fully faithful to the rule of law, they will continue to
pursue their own policy preferences in the hope that the Supreme Court will not
grant certiorari and reverse. We nevertheless expect the adjustments to resemble
those from a completely faithful court of appeals, although with smaller
magnitudes. However, when the courts of appeals are reluctant to adhere to the
Supreme Court's standard, the Court will continue to signal greater deference
relative to the courts of appeals' decisions for more than two years.
3. The Supreme Court Signal. We turn next to the nature of the Supreme
Court's signal. As discussed above, we can deduce the direction of change that
the Court desires by considering together appeals court and Supreme Court
actions on each case. We consider only the implications of actions on cases that
the Court hears (the step six decision), although denials of certiorari, despite the
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protestations of the Court, probably carry information to lower courts, agencies,
and appellants as well.
As shown in Figure 7, there are four possible step six actions: upholding or
reversing the government on cert affirm cases, and upholding or reversing the
government on cert reverse cases. The simplest interpretation-again, a first cut
at a methodology-holds that the Supreme Court issues a signal for change only
when it reverses the lower courts. Thus, upholding the government on a cert
reverse case carries a signal for greater deference, and reversing the government
on a cert affirm case signals a preference for a lower level of deference. Both
of the other actions signal that the Supreme Court finds the appeals court
standard of deference acceptable.
The importance of the selective granting of certiorari now becomes apparent.
Suppose the Supreme Court grants certiorari only to cert affirm cases. If the
Supreme Court upholds all such cases, it signals that the appeals courts' level of
deference is acceptable. Now suppose that in the subsequent year the Supreme
Court reviews only cert reverse cases, and that it upholds the government in
none of these cases. Because the Court continues to affirm appeals courts in all
of its decisions, it is likewise signaling that the lower courts' level of deference
is acceptable. Thus, even though the Supreme Court uphold rate drops from one
to zero, it signals the same desired level of deference to agency discretion in year
1 as in year 0. Now consider the following modification in the second year: the
Supreme Court grants certiorari only to cert reverse cases, and it upholds the
government (that is, it, reverses the courts of appeals) in twenty percent of the
cases. Despite a drop in the uphold rate from one to .20, the Supreme Court
would be signaling for an increase in judicial deference. Thus, the Supreme
Court uphold rate by itself carries no information about a change in its desired
standard of deference; however, if we know the action of the appeals court we
can determine whether the Court has changed preferences from the previous
term, and the direction of the change.
Figure 8 plots courts of appeals' uphold rates on administrative law cases
granted certiorari between 1983 and 1990, as well as courts of appeals' uphold
rate on all administrative law cases in the previous year.7" The Figure indicates
that the Supreme Court is not drawing randomly from the appellate caseload, for
if that were the case the two lines would roughly coincide. Furthermore, the
uphold rate varies from year to year, suggesting that the Supreme Court is
strategically granting certiorari.
Figure 9 plots courts of appeals uphold rates on certiorari cases (the cert
uphold rate) and the Supreme Court uphold rate on the same caseload. Note
that in 1984 the share of cert affirm cases drops from 1983-- that is, the Supreme
Court hears more cert reverse cases--while the Court's uphold rate increases.
78. As cases granted certiorari are drawn from the previous year's caseload, the relevant
comparison is between cases decided by the appellate court in year t-1 and cases granted certiorari in
year t.
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Taken together, these patterns suggest that the Court is requesting greater
deference. In most years, the types of cases and Court uphold rates give an
ambiguous picture. For example, in 1989 the Court uphold rate increase, but it
heard more cases on which the appeals courts also affirmed the agency.
FIGURE 8
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To determine the implicit signal in these years requires some method of
balancing the four actions at step six (that is, the different Supreme Court
decisions). In each year, the Court reviews both cert affirm cases and cert
reverse cases, and issues apparently conflicting opinions. Presumably, lower
courts and the other actors combine all of the decisions into an overall
assessment of the preferences of the Supreme Court. While any specific formula
that combines cases is somewhat arbitrary in that it presumes particular weights
on the different cases, several principles seem reasonable. These are reflected
in the formula and statistical analysis presented below.
First, lower courts presumably balance decisions within the two main
categories (cert affirm cases, cert reverse cases). If the Supreme Court upholds
the government in most cert reverse cases, it issues multiple decisions for greater
deference and few decisions affirming the appeals courts' attempts to rein in the
government. The opposite situation holds when the Court reverses the
government in most cert affirm cases: in most of the situations reviewed, the
Court disagreed with the appeals courts' decisions to grant deference to agencies.
In general, the greater share of lower court reversals in each category, the
stronger the signal to lower courts to increase or decrease deference.
Second, in balancing the signals for greater and lesser deference, one should
take account of the number or share of cases reviewed in each category, and give
greater weight accordingly. In part, this principle reflects the importance of
certiorari choices by the Supreme Court. The possibility of sending a signal for
greater deference exists only when the Court reviews cert reverse cases, while a
signal for less deference can be sent only when the Court reviews cert affirm
cases. In addition, a better signal is sent when it is based on more decisions,
because a greater share of the appellate caseload will be directly comparable to
a case granted certiorari.
Third, the signal should allow for different degrees of appellate court
independence. When courts of appeals are fully independent, they pay no
attention to Supreme Court decisions, whatever they may be, and the signal is
ineffective. Presumably, the closer the appeals courts are in policy space to the
Supreme Court, the more eager they will be to follow Supreme Court directives.
These principles are reflected in the following formulation of appellate court
response to Supreme Court decisions.79
Let:
A,.1 = the courts of appeals uphold rate in period t-1
P, = share of cases granted cert in period t for which the court of appeals upheld
the government (share of cert affirm cases)
U, = the Supreme Court government uphold rate for cert affirm cases
R t = the Supreme Court government uphold rate for cert reverse cases
79. Other formulae exist that also take these principles into account. We present this calculation
to demonstrate the methodology, and plan to investigate other possibilities in further research. At this
point, greater precision in modeling is not justified by the accuracy of the available data. See infra part
III.B.4. for a further discussion of the data.
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ax = the court of appeals independence parameter, where 0 < a _ o-. Larger
values of a correspond to greater court of appeals independence.
A*,, = the rate at which the courts of appeals would have upheld the government
on the year t-1 caseload, had they known in advance the Supreme Court's
decisions on cases from year t-1 granted cert and decided in year t.
Equation 1 characterizes court of appeals' adjustments to Supreme Court
decisions:
(1) A-,.1 = A,.,[1 - f(,)(1 - Ue -a] + (1 - A, 1)f(1-PdRte'
Note in equation 1 that the courts of appeals increase their uphold rates in
response to higher Supreme Court uphold rates (U, and R,). The independence
parameter, cc, controls the response to Ut and R,: when a = 0, response is
maximal; when a is infinite, the courts of appeals ignore Supreme Court
decisions. Finally, for higher values of f(,) courts of appeals pay more attention
to Supreme Court actions in cert affirm cases, while for higher values of f(1-3)
courts of appeals pay more attention to Supreme Court actions in cert reverse
cases. In the calculations we let f(x) = xy'. Increasing returns to cert apply when
y > 1 and decreasing returns to cert exist when y < 1. The linear cert model,
where y=0, assumes that f(3d = 5, and f(1-Pd = 1A.
Finally, note that in this formulation the signal is independent of possible
adjustments in caseload in response to policy changes by the Supreme Court.
What A*,- measures is the appeals courts' projected uphold rate on the same
cases that are under review by the Supreme Court, had they known the Court's
decisions in advance. A', 1 captures the change in the discretionary standard
used by courts of appeals after observing the signal (R, Ut, Pt) in year t, and is
independent of changes in the caseload.
Rearranging equation 1 yields the following equation:
(2) (A*1 - Aa)ea = (1 - A1.)f(1 - BJR, - At.Lf(B)(1 - Ud
The right-hand side of equation 2 yields an estimate of Supreme Court signals.
That is, by choosing (R,, U, , 0), the Court indicates that it desired appeals
courts to uphold the government in year t-1 at rate A*,- rather than A,,.
All of the factors on the left hand side of equation 2 can be estimated. ac,
however, cannot be estimated from the available data, so that we can reach
conclusions only about whether A*,, is greater or less than A,.,, but not about its
magnitude. If it is assumed that a is constant over time, the relative sizes of the
signals can be compared; we follow this strategy initially. The final section
includes a discussion of appeals courts' policy positions from which we make
further inferences about the relative size of the calculated signals.
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4. Our Results on Deference. One can estimate the implicit Supreme Court
shift signal from equation (2). To estimate the signal, one needs data about the
annual courts of appeals' affirm rate, the certiorari uphold rate, and the Supreme
Court's reversal rate of the appellate courts.
For courts of appeals' affirm rates, this article uses data from the Administra-
tive Office Annual Report of the Judicial Conference. This article also uses the
same statistics employed by Schuck and Elliott in their comparison: the ratio of
all affirmed administrative cases to all administrative cases decided on' the merits.
As Schuck and Elliott discuss, this data is far from ideal. Most problematic is
that it includes all administrative decisions, rather than just those that address
statutory interpretation cases.8s Fortunately, our results are relatively insensi-
tive to the precise values used for A,,, as long as the pattern of affirmances on
statutory interpretation cases is similar to that for all administrative cases.
The rest of the data was collected by reading Supreme Court cert cases
between 1983 and 1990. In most of the years, the Supreme Court heard about
twenty administrative appeals that required a decision on statutory interpretation.
TABLE 7 DATA
Appeals Uphold Rate Uphold Rate
Courts Cert Uphold on cert on cert
Uphold Rate Rate affmn cases reverse cases
year A,-, 0 U, R, number
1983 0.70 0.41 0.67 0.85 22
1984 0.72 0.33 0.83 0.83 18
1985 0.74 0.38 0.63 1.00 21
1986 0.76 0.19 0.75 0.71 21
1987 0.75 0.14 1.00 0.77 21
1988 0.61 0.35 1.00 0.64 17
1989 0.67 0.46 0.67 0.57 13
1990 0.70 0.50 0.67 0.67 12
The data contained in Table 7 show that there was a slight increase in the
appellate affirm rate in the mid-1980s. The differences in affirm rates are far less
dramatic in this study than the differences found by Schuck and Elliot in their
study of Federal Reporter Second Series cases, because of the discrepancies in
case collection.
The changes in the uphold rate on certiorari cases was dramatic. In the years
immediately following Chevron, the Supreme Court was reviewing far more cases
in which appellate courts reversed the government. The calculations in this
article imply that the difference in certiorari cases outweighs the drop in the
Supreme Court uphold rate of the government.
Figure 10 plots the implicit shift signal for the years 1983 to 1990, and Figure
11 plots the implicit shift signal and courts of appeals' uphold rates on cases
80. Unfortunately, the data from the Administrative Office for years prior to 1983 seem so
untrustworthy as to preclude use.
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under review in the same year. For positive values of a, the implicit signal is
exaggerated, that is, the magnitude of (A* .1 - A,.1) will be smaller than in the
calculations here. However, the pattern of signals here offers a different
interpretation of the Supreme Court uphold rates than that concluded by Merrill.
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The Chevron decision came at the end of 1984. The data suggest that in 1983
the Supreme Court was basically content with the level of discretion used by
appellate courts. We calculate a shift signal (multiplied by ea) of .05 for both
cert models. Because of the sample size and a, one can interpret a signal of this
size to be about zero. The Supreme Court then signaled a shift to a greater
discretion level in the years following the Chevron decision, especially 1986-88.
The three years of shift may indicate that the Court was moving toward a greater
discretionary standard in the years following Chevron; alternatively, it may have
been consistent with a somewhat longer adjustment period than the minimal two
years posited by our model. Thus, the pattern suggests two possibilities, both of
which probably apply in these years. First, a longer lag time may be appropriate
because of the uncertainty factors discussed above (that is, the signal is somewhat
ambiguous); second, because courts of appeals are not fully faithful to the rule
of law, they may resist the guidance of the Supreme Court.
In 1989 the Supreme Court signaled that no further shift was desired. The
calculated shift rate drops to 0. Finally, in 1990, the Supreme Court signaled a
small negative shift. As previously mentioned, these latter years are based on
a much smaller number of certiorari cases, and the small magnitudes suggest that
little adjustment is desired in the appellate standard of discretion.
These conclusions differ from those of Merrill. Statistically, this article
observes no retreat from Chevron through 1988. The drop in the Supreme Court
uphold rate in 1986-88 is consistent with a sustained shift in its desired deference
level. The Supreme Court decisions in 1989 and 1990 might have suggested a
signal for reduced deference, so that K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., l decided in
1988, may have indeed represented a turning point as Merrill hypothesizes.
However, we must emphasize that all of the signals are based on a small number
of cases and that our conclusions are accordingly preliminary.
Let us now recast these results in terms of the rational choice explanation of
Chevron. By the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court and the administrative agencies
had moved to a conservative policy position relative to both Congress and the
appellate courts. Consequently, agencies could rule in a conservative manner
only by exercising greater discretion relative to their statutes, and the Supreme
Court could enforce those decisions by tying the hands of the appellate courts
by signaling that they should allow agencies greater discretion in interpreting the
statutes. Following Chevron, continued signals from the Supreme Court in
accord with the lags are posited in our model. Furthermore, the appellate
uphold rate increases and then declines as the rational equilibrium model of case
filings predicts.
Assuming that the negative shift calculated for 1989 and 1990 holds up with
more data, and that it continues into 1991 and 1992, the data may further
indicate that by the late 1980s, courts of appeals had moved closer to the
Supreme Court's policy position. Furthermore, it may indicate that the
81. 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
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administrative agencies under President Bush had become more liberal than the
best interpretation of statutory language. In this case, one would expect that the
Supreme Court would want courts of appeals to take a more active role in
binding agencies to statutory language, and hence that the deference level would
be reduced.
In conclusion, then, in the late 1980s the Supreme Court was not moving
away from Chevron, but rather signaling that the current appellate standard for
deference was acceptable and that no further shift was needed. Thus, the
Supreme Court decisions in the 1980s were consistent with a sustained shift in
the Supreme Court's desired level of deference following Chevron. The data
could also be consistent with some retreat from Chevron in 1990.
5. Measuring Ideal Points? As we have already indicated, we will do little
beyond the impressionistic check of ideal points that were used discursively when
setting up the model. In 1981, President Reagan seemed to be much more
conservative than ex-President Carter. In 1981 the Senate fell into Republican
control, and then in 1986 returned to Democratic control. Hence, a large move
right, then left, for S seems justified. The House stayed fairly liberal throughout
this era. The ideal points of the Justices in the plane necessarily represent a
great deal of guesswork. Thus, there is no independent measure of the ideal
points along the deference axis. However, during the 1980-85 period there was
only one change on the Supreme Court: Sandra Day O'Connor replacing Potter
Stewart in 1981. These two probably differed little along the policy axis. If
O'Connor and Stewart also occupied similar positions in the deference
dimension, using the same Justices-i, 2, and 3 might be acceptable. President
Reagan appointed two more Justices to the Supreme Court. In 1986, Antonin
Scalia replaced Warren Burger. In 1988, Anthony Kennedy replaced Lewis
Powell. Each of these new Justices probably represented a significant move to
the right along the policy axis; each would seem to have an incentive to give
agencies deference in order to gain more conservative policies if each also
preferred that agencies, rather than courts, interpret statutes. In 1989, David
Souter replaced William Brennan, again probably best represented by a large
move to the right.
We have attempted to quantify the location of courts of appeals on the policy
axis. For each year from 1977 to 1992, we coded all of the judges on the U.S.
courts of appeals according to the political party of the nominating president and
the majority party of the confirming Senate. Thus, there are four possible
codings for each judge: Democratic president and Democratic Senate ("DD"),
Democratic president and Republican Senate ("DR"), Republican president and
Democratic Senate ("RD"), and Republican president and Republican Senate
("RR"). Within each period we divided each group into active and senior status
("SS"). Then, for each year, we calculated an index of average ideology for
courts of appeals, using the following formula:
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(0(number active DD + (.5)number SS DD) + .7(number active RD +
(.5)number SS RD) + (number active RR + .5(number SS RR))/((number
active DD+RD+RR)+(5) (number SS DD + SS RD + SS RR))
This formula presumes several things. First, the president gets seventy percent
of the surplus in a bargaining game with the Senate of the opposite party.
Second, the party of the president and the Senate, rather than the party of the
nominee, predict the judge's ideology. Third, once one knows the party of the
president and the Senate one has as much information as one needs to describe
ideologies. In addition, the formula neglects institutional structures. In the
judiciary, the majority rule nature of panels and the methods of choosing panels
should be modeled,' and in the Senate, the committee system should be
included.s' Nevertheless, the formula gives a reasonable approximation of what
one should expect from courts of appeals.
following results:
The calculations produced the
TABLE 8
CALCULATIONS
DD RD RR
Act SS Act SS Act SS
Ideology
Index
1977 44 20 50 22 0 5 .38
1978 45 17 50 19 0 5 .38
1979 70 18 48 17 0 3 .30
1980 73 20 47 21 0 4 .30
1981 76 23 43 22 1 3 .28
1982 79 26 42 25 17 4 .35
1983 76 28 40 24 22 4 .36
1984 78 23 36 22 33 4 .40
1985 70 27 32 26 41 4 .43
1986 67 30 28 27 60 6 .49
1987 63 34 32 30 61 6 .51
1988 65 26 39 28 61 5 .52
1989 56 34 38 31 59 7 .53
1990 50 35 49 31 58 4 .55
1991 47 40 53 31 55 7 .55
1992 43 37 59 33 54 8 .57
Courts of appeals
they have since that
drifted to the left during
time moved consistently
the Carter Administration, but
to the right. The movement,
82. There is probably little systematic ideological bias in assigning cases to panels of judges; thus,
the method used here of computing the average ideological index is most likely accurate. One could
compute the probabilities of obtaining a three judge panel on which the median voter was DD or DR
or RR, and then multiply the three probabilities by 0, .7, and 1 to get a better index. We leave this as
an exercise for the interested reader. Hint: when computing the probabilities, be sure to count SS
judges as only half as likely ex ante.
83. For a discussion on the extent to which the majority party controls the committee system, see
GARY Cox & MATHEW MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY GoVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE
(1993).
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however, was fairly slow. It was not until 1986 or 1987 that the average federal
appellate judge could be considered "middle of the road" on the U.S. political
highway. This fits reasonably well with the rational choice explanation of
Chevron. Courts of appeals moved to the right of the Best Statutory Interpreta-
tion, and the occasional forays into setting policy were in a conservative
direction. Such a situation probably pleased the increasingly conservative
Supreme Court Justices, who may have in turn reacted by signaling a small
decrease in deference to administrative agencies by about 1989. The data on the
Supreme Court's shift signals are consistent with such a story.
6. Other Models and the Data. How do the other two explanations stack up
against the data? Explaining Chevron as a manifestation of the Justices' genuine
preferences about relations between the federal courts and the administrative
agencies fits with the data. If all of the Justices suddenly realized at the end of
1984 that the federal courts really ought, either as a matter of democratic theory
or as a matter of respect for agency expertise, to defer to administrative statutory
interpretations, then one would expect to see a fairly sustained signal from the
Supreme Court to courts of appeals for more deference. The analysis of lags
between the Supreme Court's first signal and the point where the administrative
cases had changed character and finally worked their way through the system to
the Supreme Court would be left unchanged. Hence, this explanation could
work.
This sort of explanation lacks power and strains credulity. It lacks power
because it offers no way of dealing with conflicting opinions such as Chevron and
Cardoza-Fonseca. It also lacks power because it cannot predict changes unless
augmented by a method of predicting when Justices will change their minds. In
short, this explanation strains credulity because the assumption that Justices care
only about process, and not about policy, seems so unlikely.
The logrolling model does about as well with the data as the above
explanation. If one were to think that somewhere in 1984 the Justices suddenly
decided to trade votes on some cases that would explain the data. However, the
logrolling model's defects have already been outlined, and nothing in the data
can fix them. There is no natural tripartite division of administrative agencies
that would produce the unanimous vote in Chevron. In addition, it would be
difficult to enforce the logroll. 4
7. Predictions. In the Clinton Presidency, one would expect administrative
agencies to move significantly to the left, so that agency ideal points are to the
left of the BSI point. But the majority of Justices and judges on both the
Supreme Court and courts of appeals will probably remain conservative; it will
take a while for Clinton's appointments to move these two institutions.
Assuming that the Justices on the Supreme Court are not so enamored of
84. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
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deference that it swamps their preferences for conservative policy outcomes, the
Supreme Court will most likely signal courts of appeals to give less deference to
administrative agencies. This situation is pictured in Figure 11.
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CONCLUSION
Eskridge and Ferejohn, Schuck and Elliott, and Merrill have all advanced our
understanding of the Chevron decision. Eskridge and Ferejohn's models of the
interaction within the administrative state highlight the changes wrought by the
introduction of powerful administrative agencies. Their models also correctly
emphasize the role of judicial review in the article I, section 7 game. This article
has attempted to extend their analysis to answer the puzzle of why a rational
Supreme Court would adopt such a rule. The best explanation centers on the
Supreme Court Justices' preferences for both administrative procedures and
policy outcomes, as well as the Court's need to deal with the many lower federal
courts in a world of scarce resources. These forces combine to explain the
unanimous opinion in Chevron. Schuck and Elliott provided an extensive data
base that gave the first view of the facts of administrative adjudication. Merrill's
data provided the first look at Supreme Court decisionmaking before and after
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Chevron. But their data left several puzzles unsolved. This article solved a
couple of them by testing a more sophisticated model of Chevron by accounting
for the signaling function of Supreme Court opinions. The results were
consistent with the rational choice explanation of Chevron as a method for
controlling the behavior of the appellate courts.
